WHETHER AN ACTION CAN BE COMMENCED OR HINGED ON AN INCOMPETENT OR IRREGULAR POWER OF ATTORNEY – MAGISTRATE COURT JUDGMENT IN SUIT NO: MCB/210/2010 & 15 OTHERS BY HIS HONOUR MAGISTRATE M.A. ETTI.

IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF LAGOS STATE

IN THE BADAGRY MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT

HOLDEN AT COURT NO. 1BADAGRY

WEDNESDAY THE 22ND DAY OF APRIL 2015

BEFORE HIS HONOUR MAGISTRATE M.A.ETTI

SUIT NO:

MCB/210/2010 & 15 OTHERS

(Suits consolidated by court

order of 7 October 2013)

BETWEEN:

CHIEF KENNETH AJOKU              …        …        …        …            CLAIMANT

(Suing as Attorney of the landlord:

Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd)

AND

FOLORUNSHO SHOLANKE& 15 OTHERS        …        …            DEFENDANTS

J U D G M E N T

This is a consolidated suit by a court order of 7 October 2013 involving sixteen (16) tenancy matters in which the claimant sued for possession, arrears of rent, and mesne profits on sixteen flats occupied by sixteen defendants at Block 1, T Close, 3rd Avenue,Festac Town, Lagos State. The sixteen suits are:

SUIT NO                                 PARTIES                             PREMISES

• MCB /202/2010 Ajoku v Alabi                          two bedroom flat
• MCB/203/2010 Ajoku v Aromeh                     two bedroom flat
• MCB/204/2010 Ajoku v Olajubutu                  two bedroom flat
• MCB/205/2010 Ajoku v Ikhalo                        two bedroom flat
• MCB/206/2010 Ajoku v Ikemefuna                 two bedroom flat
• MCB/208/2010 Ajoku v Ogunleye                   two bedroom flat
• MCB/211/2010 Ajoku v Mgbolu                      two bedroom flat
• MCB/212/2010 Ajoku v Olayemi                     two bedroom flat
• MCB/213/2010 Ajoku v Udekwe                    two bedroom flat
• MCB/214/2010 Ajoku v Lawal                        two bedroom flat
• MCB/215/2010 Ajoku v Akamadu                  two bedroom flat
• MCB/216/2010 Ajoku v Yanfa                         two bedroom flat
• MCB/207/2010 Ajoku v Onova                       three bedroom flat
• MCB/209/2010 Ajoku v Ogodo                       three bedroom flat
• MCB/210/2010 Ajoku v Sholanke                   three bedroom flat
• MCB/217/2010 Ajoku v Akinwunmi               three bedroom flat

All the sixteen suits were consolidated in MCB/210/2010 on the application dated 18 September 2013 by the learned counsel for all the defendants.

THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS are in two categories. One category relates to occupants of two-bedroom flats against whom the claimant claims severally possession, N750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.The second category comprises occupants of three-bedroom flats against whom the claimant claims severally possession, N1,050,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N400,000.00k per annum (N33,333.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

EXHIBITS

Very many documents were admitted in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 52. Exhibits 9^a-pare copies of the statutory notices. Each of Exhibits 9^a-p comprises a Quit Notice and an Owner’s Intention To Recover Possession. For example, while exhibit 9^a comprises the Quit Notice and an Owner’s Intention To Recover Possession issued to Folorunsho Sholanke, the Defendant in MCB/ 210/2010, exhibit 9^b comprises the quit notice and an owner’s intention to recover possession issued to Rev. Samuel A. Akinwunmi, the Defendant in MCB/ 217/2010.

Each quit notice was issued on 15 May 2009 to expire on 31 December 2009. Each owner’s intention to recover possession was issued on 1 February 2010.

The following documents were tendered by the claimant:

1. Claimant’s written deposition (exhibit 1)
2. Power of Attorney (exhibit 2)
3. Valuation Certificate (exhibit 3)
4. Consolidation of FMBN (exhibit 4)
5. Offer of Terms of conveyance (exhibit 5)
6. Rent Review (exhibit 6)
7. Full settlement of Retirement Benefit (exhibit 7)
8. Report of Task force (exhibit 8)
9. Sixteen quit notices and owner’s intention to recover possession (exhibit 9^a-p)

The following documents were tendered by the defendants:

1. Written deposition of DWI (exhibit 10)
2. Certificate of identification (exhibit I1)
3. Memo dated 19-6-1997 (exhibit 12)
4. Memo dated 17-9-1995 (exhibit 13)
5. Circular dated 19-9-2003 (exhibit 14)
6. Letter of Transfer of service dated 26-I l-2003 (exhibit 15)
7. Termination of appointment dated 16-12-2oo 3 (exhibit 16)
8. Document listed as No. 6 on the List of documents (Rejected 1)
9. Document listed as No. 7(Rejected 2)
10. Written deposition of DW2 (exhibit 17)
11. Memo dated 26-3-93 (exhibit 18)
12. Circular dated 19-9- 2003 (exhibit 19)
13. Retirement Letter dated 26-11-1993 (exhibit 21)
14. Memo dated 19-6-97 (exhibit 22)
15. List of documents (exhibit 23)
16. Certificate of identification (exhibit 24)

17. Photocopies of two documents obtained from the internet (Rejected 3 & 4)
18. Photocopy of statement of claim in suit M/544/2007 (exhibit 25)
19. Letter dated 16-5-2009 (exhibit 26)
20. Letter dated l1- 3-2009 (exhibit 27)
21. Terms of settlement dated l-7-13 (exhibit 28)
22. Enrolment of order dated 18-12-13 (exhibit 29)
23. Letter dated 26-6 -1 3(exhibit 30)
24. Certified true copy of judgment dated 12-l-14 (exhibit 31)
25. Written deposition of DW3 (exhibit 32)
26. Memo dated 19-6-97 (exhibit 33)
27. Memo dated 23-7-91 (exhibit 34)
28. Circular dated 19-9-2003 (exhibit 35)
29. Letter dated 27-l0-95 (exhibit 36)
30. Certificate of identification (exhibit 37)
31. Photocopies of FMB document obtained from the internet (exhibit 38)
32. Photocopies of FMFL document obtained from the internet (exhibit 39)
33. C .T .C of affidavit & attachments (exhibit 40)
34. Written deposition of Dw4 (exhibit 41)
35. Copy of letter dated 22-11-93 (exhibit 42)
36. Copy of letter dated 26-11-2003 (exhibit 43)
37. Copy of termination letter dated 16-12-2003 (exhibit 44)
38. One document (exhibit 45)
39. NHF Misconceptions (exhibit 46)
40. Certificate pursuant to section 84 Evidence Act (exhibit 47)
41. Search report on FMFL with a certificate pursuant to section 84 Evidence Act (exhibit 48)
42. Notice of existing suits dated 13-8-2008 (exhibit 49)
43. Revenue Demand Notice dated 28-2-14 (exhibit 50)
44. Certified True Copy of a document (exhibit 51)
45. Document dated 26-2-09 (exhibit 52^a-e)

Only the claimant’s attorney (CWl) testified on behalf of the claimant. Four of the defendants testified on behalf of the defendants.

There have been so many twists in this case and even in this judgment two pending applications are to be ruled upon.

THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT is that the claimant is an offshoot of Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN). The defendants were employees of FMBN until their services were transferred to the claimant in 1993 following deconsolidation of FMBN under Decree 82 of 1993 which split FMBN into two entities namely Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) and Federal Mortgage Finance Limited (FMFL) so that FMFL took over the retail mortgage services of FMBN and the employment of the defendants including all the terms and conditions of service of the defendants. Accordingly, FMFL inherited some assets and liabilities of FMBN and became the employers of the defendants who continued to occupy their respective flats as service tenants of the claimant, their new employer. The flats occupied by the defendants were allocated to FMFL under the sharing of assets schedule as evidenced by the Report of the Task Force on the Deconsolidation of FMBN (Exhibit 8).

Following their transfer the defendants paid rents to the claimant till they retired (some of them in 1995 and others 2003). Thereafter, they refused to pay their rents despite several demands.

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS is that all the sixteen defendants were former employees of the FMBN. In 1993 FMBN was deconsolidated into two separate and distinct entities namely FMBN and FMFL. The services of the defendants ‘were transferred to FMFL continuous, as if we were still with FMBN with entitlements to all our pensions and gratuities’(paragraph 5 of the Written Deposition of the Defendants). ‘As staff of FMBN whose services were transferred to FMFL’, the defendants ‘were allotted block of flats at T close 3rd Avenue Festac Town Lagos State’ (paragraph 6 of the Written Deposition of the Defendants). The defendants were retired at various times namely 1995 and 2003. Some of them were given compulsory retirement by FMFL while others retired voluntarily based on an option offered by FMFL. Each of them paid his rent till his retirement but not afterwards. Each defendant believes that FMFL was liquidated and dead before this suit was brought and therefore could not have competently instituted it. Each one believes that ownership of the premises belongs to FMBN and since his pension and gratuities has not been fully paid, FMFL is not entitled to possession.

ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANTS

1. Whether the property at T close, 3rd Avenue,Festac Town, Lagos State belongs to FMBN or FMFL.
2. Whether an action can be commenced or hinged on an incompetent or irregular power of attorney viz-a-viz that issued by a non-legal entity.
3. Whether oral evidence can be used to vary the content of documents.
4. Whether re-examination can be used as an avenue for a party to reopen his case and whether to admit a document tendered during re-examination does not amount to a denial of the right to fair hearing of a party who is unable to cross-examine on the document
5. Whether a person can be bound by a document or any agreement which he knows nothing about and for which he gave no authority to any other to act on his behalf.

ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE CLAIMANT

1. Having regard to the evidence led in this case, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, who is the lawful landlord of the defendants so as to determine whether the claim of recovery of possession of the subject property from the defendants and arrears of rent and mesne profit has been proved in this case.
2. Whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the claimant company has liquidated since 2003 and has ceased to exist since then hence is not a valid legal personality to maintain present action in property recovery.
3. Whether the claimant (sic) attorney’s power of attorney which is the locus of this case is incompetent, irregular and forged having regard to the available evidence led in this case and to all the material circumstances of this case.
4. Whether documents tendered and marked rejected can be re-admitted in this suit and whether a document admitted in evidence during re-examination can be expunged when same is already a document in the court’s file before the trial.
5. Whether this court is competent to determine issues relating to appropriate terminal benefit payable to an employee from his employer and to resolve disputes arising thereto.

ARGUMENTS

THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL can be summarized as follows:

1. The defendants recognized the claimant as their landlord by paying rent to it while in service and that fact was also stated in paragraph 14 of their statement of claim in M/544/07 which is exhibit 25 herein and also in exhibit 26 wherein the defendants acknowledged the claimant as their landlord while responding to the claimant’s offer to buy their respective premises. The defendants are estopped from denying the title of the claimant. Moreover, this is a tenancy matter and title is not in issue.
2. Exhibits 28, 29, 30 and 31 are uncontroverted evidence of judicial recognition of the continuing corporate existence and juristic personality of the claimant. In Exhibit 31 which is a certified true copy of a judgment of Lagos High Court per Taiwo, J in LD/1395/ 06 delivered on 17 January 2014 the corporate existence of the claimant was recognized.
3. A search report at the Corporate Affairs Commission (Exhibit 48) shows that the board of directors of the claimant was reconstituted in 2004 contrary to the assertion of the defendants that the claimant liquidated and died in 2003. Furthermore, winding up or liquidation process does not terminate the life of a company; only dissolution does. Moreover, the claimant is a creation of statute and only a statute can bring it to an end.
4. The claimant has exercised acts of possession since 1993 without any challenge from any quarters including the defendants. This is evidenced by Exhibits 5 & 6 (Allocation Letter and Rent Review Notice).
5. CWI’s power of attorney was given to continue to be in force and has not expired. In addition, the learned counsel for the claimant adopted his submission in his written address dated 9 December 2013 in opposition to the defendant’s motion on notice dated 11 October 2013.
6. Exhibits 38, 39, 45, 46 & 47 which are computer generated printout photocopies were wrongly admitted having been earlier rejected as Rejected l, 2, 3 & 4. The said documents lack probative value and ought to be expunged.
7. Since an exhibit can be admitted at any stage of the trial, a trial court is not entitled to expunge exhibits admitted in re-examination such as exhibit 52^a-e unless their admission was a nullity. Moreover, exhibits 52^a-e are documents already in the court’s file as documents attached to the claimant’s counter affidavit dated 29 March 201l in opposition to the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection. The court is entitled to use such documents.
8. This court lacks the jurisdiction to determine issues on industrial dispute or terminal entitlements of the defendants, but exhibit 7 was tendered to show evidence of payment of such benefits. A comparison of the signatures in exhibits 7 and 26 will show the same result.

A number of authorities were cited in support.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS can be summarized as follows:

1. The premises belong to FMBN because exhibit 8 is not an instrument of transfer of title and did not transfer title in the premises from FMBN to FMFL. Other reasons are (a)exhibit 8 prepared and unsigned in 1993 by any member of the committee that prepared it but was signed in 2009 by Mr. Asogwa who was not an initial member of the committee; (b) Exhibit 8 was not registered; (c) it is a draft because it describes itself as being tentative; (d) In 2014 in Exhibit 50 Federal Housing Development Authority (FHDA) demanded for land use charge on the premises from FMBN and not from FMFL because FMBN is the owner and landlord of the premises; (e) the claimant is not allowed to vary it by oral testimony.
2. Since the claimant was liquidated in 2003 it could not have donated the power of attorney in 2008 upon which CWI instituted this action. The court judgment (Exhibit 31) exhibited by the claimant is no proof of its existence. Also, the judgment was not pleaded. Since the liquidation of the claimant was approved in a Federal Government of Nigeria white paper, the claimant has the onus to prove by another white paper that the liquidation of the claimant was cancelled. The signatory of the power of attorney Mr. Asogwa was on the staff of FMBN in 2008 because he was transferred to FMBN in 2003 and sacked in 2010 by FMBN. Therefore, he could not have signed the power of Attorney (on behalf of FMFL) in 2008. Accordingly, the power of attorney is a forgery. Since FMFL is in liquidation only its liquidator can sue on its behalf.
3. Admission of exhibit 52 in re-examination is a breach of the defendant’s fundamental right to fair hearing.
4. Exhibit 7 purportedly signed by representatives of the retirees of FMFL cannot bind the defendants without their consent.
5. By virtue of exhibits 8, 16, 38, 40 & 50 the claimant is not the owner of the premises and is not entitled to possession.
6. The valuation report (exhibit 3) was not tendered by its maker and it cannot be used to assess arrears of rent and mesne profits because the rent stated therein was not based on agreement of parties.

A number of authorities were cited in support.

THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THIS COURT are:

1. Whether there is a landlord and tenant relationship between the parties.
2. Whether this suit is competent.
3. Whether the claimant is entitled to possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits.

MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 11 OCTOBER 2013 &MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 13 OCTOBER 2014

THE MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 11 OCTOBER 2013 was brought under order 9 rule 1 of the Magistrates’ Court Law 2009 and the inherent jurisdiction of this honourable court for the following orders:

1. An order nullifying and setting aside the power of attorney purportedly granted to Chief Kenneth Chukwuemeka Ajoku, the plaintiff in this suit (suing as attorney of the landlord Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd) by Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd having been grossly affected and tainted with fraud and forgery.
2. An order dismissing this suit in its entirety having been wholly founded on the forged power of attorney.

The grounds of the application are:

1. The power of attorney purportedly granted by Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd in 2008 could not have been granted when Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd was liquidated and dissolved in 2003.
2. The preparation, franking, and attestation of the said power of attorney being a product of forgery and fraud, is incapable of granting the purported power of attorney to the plaintiff Chief Kenneth Chukwuemeka Ajoku.
3. The stamp duty was also fraudulently procured.
4. The criminal allegation of forgery by Chief Kenneth Chukwuemeka Ajoku, a legal practitioner does not only affect the root of this case but is a repulsive erosion of the very foundation of the legal profession and is thus worthy of thorough judicial enquiry.
5. The forged power of attorney is the very root and foundation of the plaintiff’s witness deposition on oath dated 22 August 2013.

The application is supported by an eight-paragraph affidavit and two exhibits. The learned counsel for the applicant identified three issues:

1. Whether in the interest of justice, and the legal profession, the points raised in the affidavit in support of this motion (particularly paragraphs 6 and 7 as pertaining to the facts of forgery and uttering of the power of attorney which forms the foundation of the plaintiff’ locus), ought not to be set down for hearing as a special case and specifically pronounced upon by this honourable court.
2. Whether the power of attorney which forms the basis for the locus of the plaintiff and this case, is affected and tainted with fraud and forgery and ought to be nullified and set aside.
3. Whether the plaintiff’s deposition on oath dated 22 August 2013 and indeed the whole suit having been wholly founded on the forged power of attorney ought to be struck out and dismissed respectively, being a product of fraud and forgery.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT

can be summarized as follows:

1. ‘in reaction to the plaintiff’s witness deposition on oath dated 22 August 213, the defendants filed this motion wherein a fundamental issue of forgery of the power of attorney dated 7 February 2008 which has been pleaded by the plaintiff as raised. The issues of crime raised in this motion and affidavit is palpable and profound, as it is not just a mere allegation, but one that is  manifestly evident on the face of the said power of attorney which is being flaunted by the plaintiff as his locus to sue in this case.’ Paragraph 4.5.
2. ‘The defendants/applicants’ affidavit in support of this motion has not only made the genuineness and authenticity of the power of attorney an issue, but has unequivocally stated that the said power of attorney is a product of criminal forgery and uttering (sic)…the defendants have also stated that there is substantial involvement and complicity of a legal practitioner in the alleged crime.’ Paragraph 4.6.
3. ‘it is apposite for this court to borrow a leaf from a recent decision of the High Court of Lagos State in which a legal practitioner was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on each of the 10 counts of crime involving fraud and forgery of land documents.’ Paragraph 4.15.
4. ‘The action of the plaintiff attorney is a calamity to the administration of justice and the Nigerian society at large, and must not be made to face the law.’ Paragraph 4.21.
5. ‘the indices of fraud and forgery are provable and manifest on the face of the said power of attorney.’ Paragraph 5.1.
6. ‘we respectfully invite this honourable court to inspect the said power of attorney and the signature thereto, and compare it with the signature of one M.I. Asogwa (in exhibits A and B annexed to the affidavit) who was the managing director of Federal Mortgage Finance Limited in 2003 when it was liquidated …we submit that it is either Mr. M.I. Asogwa is complicit in this fraud, or that his signature had been forged by the person who prepared the said power of attorney’. Paragraph 5.4.
7. ‘Mr. M.I. Asogwa was the fully recognized managing director/chief executive of the Federal Mortgage Finance Limited before its liquidation in 2003, however in the said power of attorney, the said signatory was in an acting capacity.’ Paragraph 5.7.

A number of authorities were cited in support.

The claimant responded to the motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 with a counter affidavit dated 7 November 2013.The learned counsel for the claimant/respondent identified two issues:

1. Whether this application is not a fresh attempt to recycle the same application on an issue earlier canvassed by the applicants vide their preliminary objection in this suit dated 9-04-2010 which was dismissed by this court.
2. If the first issue is resolved in the affirmative, whether this court is not functus officio as concerning this latest application of the defendants.

THE SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT can be summarized as follows:

1. ‘A close study of the earlier preliminary objection of the defendants dated 9-04-2010 in this suit, particularly of that application i.e. Exhibit KCA 1, taken together with their further affidavit dated 19-05-2010 in support of this same application i.e. Exhibit KCA 2, paragraphs 4 i-v and 5 I and ii a-d of that same affidavit sworn to by the same deponent that swore to the affidavit in support of their latest application dated 11-10-2013 i.e. one Mr. Julius Ajayi a litigation manager in the firm of Taiwo Kupolati & Co. will reveal that this latest application is substantially the same issues already canvassed by the applicants in their aforesaid earlier preliminary objection, which this court gave a considered ruling on the issue and dismissed’. Paragraph 4.1.
2. Having dismissed the preliminary objection on the same issues as this application, this court has become functus officio to revisit the issues.
3. Allegation of forgery requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be thrashed without trial.

A number of authorities were cited in support.

This motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 was moved after the claimant closed its case on 19 November 2013. That same day the defendants closed their case without calling any witness and this suit was adjourned till 18 December 2013 for adoption of final written addresses. On 18 December 2013 the claimant moved a new application dated 9 December 2013 and that made the defendants reopen their defence. On 9 September 2014 the defendants informed this court that they had a subpoena to call Mr. Asogwa (who signed the power of attorney) to testify on the authority under which the claimant instituted this suit. It was opposed by the claimant’s counsel in the following words:

‘The defendants are going round and round. This issue of the authority of the attorney is the issue in a motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 and parties have argued it but the court deferred its ruling on the authority of the Supreme Court in NNPC v Amadi.

This court then ruled thus:

‘For the main reason that this application for subpoena asks for the same thing as in the defendants’ motion on notice dated 11 October 2013, this application is an abuse of court process. It is therefore refused’.

Thereafter, the defendants closed their case.

The thrust of the motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 is simply that this suit is incompetent because the power of attorney is invalid on grounds of forgery or on the ground that its donor did not possess the power so donated or is not a legal person.

On 12 September 2011 this court dismissed the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection dated 9 April 2010 praying for ‘an order dismissing or striking out this suit for being incompetent and a gross abuse of court process which incompetence and abuse rob this honourable court of jurisdiction to entertain the same’. The dismissal of the notice of preliminary objection followed a consideration of the materials before this court and particularly the issue submitted for determination on behalf of the defendants/applicants which was: whether considering the peculiar circumstances of this case with regard to the issue of title to the subject property, the competence of the plaintiff’s power of attorney, the issue of forum shopping undergone by the plaintiff, the case being an abuse of court process, this honourable court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and/or hear this matter.

In respect of the competency of the power of attorney it was submitted on behalf of the defendants/applicants (in the said notice of preliminary objection dated 9 April 2010) as follows:

Power of attorney is incompetent and/or irregular because

1. the donor, having been liquidated, no longer existed at the time of donating the power of attorney.
2. it is only its liquidator that can sue on its behalf
3. the power of the attorney was signed by one Mr.Asogwa who at the time was no longer working for his purported company FMFL.
4. the power of attorney was not taken before a magistrate or notary public.

Looking at the instant motion on notice dated 11 October 2013, it is beyond doubt that the arguments canvassed therein were the same in the notice of preliminary objection dated 9 April 2010 and the issues raised in it were resolved in the said ruling of this court delivered on 12September 2011. For that reason I hold that the motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 is an abuse of court process. It is dismissed accordingly.

MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 13 OCTOBER 2014

On 21 October 2014 the learned defence counsel informed this court that she had filed (i) an appeal against the ruling of this court dismissing the application for subpoena and (ii) a motion on notice dated 13 October 2014 for stay of proceedings.  The motion on notice dated 13 October 2014 for stay of proceedings was moved and ruling on it reserved till today.

The motion on notice dated 13 October 2014 prayed for stay of proceedings pending the determination of the appeal against the ruling of this court delivered on 9 September 2014. It is supported by a nine-paragraph affidavit deposed to by Julius Ajayi. In her written address the learned defence counsel identified one issue: Whether or not there exists special circumstances in this case to warrant the granting of the applicant’s prayer for stay of proceedings in this court, pending the determination of the appeal in the High Court.

The argument in support of the application can be summarized as follows:

1. There is a pending competent and arguable appeal.
2. This matter was not initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of a condition precedent for this court to exercise jurisdiction because the power of attorney upon which this suit was based is tainted with fraud and the defendants have challenged the competency of this suit right from the onset.
3. The defendants’ application for subpoena of MrAsogwa would have totally put the issue of competence of this suit to rest.
4. The failure of this court to first determine one way or the other the issue of jurisdiction necessitated the application for subpoena which in turn necessitated this appeal.

The claimant filed a counter-affidavit dated 21 October 2014 to the motion on notice dated 13 October 2014. In his written address dated 21 October 2014 learned counsel for the claimant identified one issue: whether the defendants/applicants has (sic), by the peculiar circumstances surrounding the application, fulfilled the conditions of special or exceptional circumstances and other factors sufficient enough to anchor the grant of stay of proceedings in this case.

Relying on several authorities, learned counsel for the claimant listed 14 principles governing the grant of stay of proceedings and submitted that the applicants not only failed to place sufficient materials before this court but also failed to show special circumstances. In paragraph 4.10 of his written address, he submitted thus: ‘having come to the terminal stage of this case, where trial has been concluded pending final judgment, for the defendants/applicants opting to lodge an interlocutory appeal instead of awaiting the outcome of the court’s ruling on their pending and already argued application on same subject issue as the one refused by court is rather hasty and frivolous and smacks of a deliberate time wasting devise to enable them keep the res of this suit indefinitely to the prejudice of the claimant’s claims in this suit. This is because if their said application succeeds, their pending appeal would become unnecessary. And if the application fails, that court ruling could be made the subject of appeal if it ultimately becomes necessary following the final judgment’.

Now, motion on notice dated 13 October 2014 is for stay of proceedings pending appeal. The appeal is against an interlocutory ruling of 9 September 2014 wherein this court ruled that an application for subpoena was an abuse of court process because it was for the same relief or purpose as the motion on notice dated 11 October 2013 (already argued but) yet to be ruled upon.

The major defect of the motion on notice dated 13 October 2014 is that it was based on an incompetent appeal or on appeal that never existed or that a condition precedent to such an application was not fulfilled. By that I mean:

1. The application has no copy of the notice of appeal attached to it to show that an appeal was filed though paragraph 3(c) of the affidavit in support states that a copy of the notice of appeal is annexed and marked Exhibit A. Furthermore, the endorsement of the cashier on the said application shows payment of fees for three processes only namely: motion on notice, affidavit and written address.No indication that exhibits were attached. Even if as stated in the body of the application that the appeal was filed in the High Court, a copy of the notice of appeal must be shown to this court, attached to the application for stay. The position now is that this application was based on a notice of appeal that has not been shown to exist in fact and in law. This is supported by the fact that throughout the three processes filed on 13 October 2014, namely motion on notice, affidavit and written address, nowhere was the notice of appeal identified such as saying a notice of appeal dated such and such.  It can then be said that the learned counsel for the claimant was right when he submitted that the defendants failed to place sufficient materials before this court.In Kotoye v. Saraki (1995) 5 NWLR (pt.394) 242 @ 264-5 the Supreme Court held thus: ‘there cannot be a stay of proceedings pending the determination of an appeal, when in fact the appeal in question is non-existent or has been aborted’.
2. The appeal in question being an interlocutory appeal ought to be at least by leave of court, even if the provision that prohibits interlocutory appeals is not invoked. Section 70 of the Magistrates’ Court Law of Lagos State 2009 provides:

(1) Other than appeals from the Magistrates’ Courts sitting on an appeal over the decision of a Customary Court where appeals shall be as of right, the permission of the Court shall be required in all civil appeals.

(2) An applicant applying for permission of the Court shall in the first instance bring an application before a Magistrates’ Court and subsequently before the High Court where the application for permission to appeal is refused by a Magistrates’ Court.

(3) There shall be no right of appeal against an interlocutory decision of a Magistrates’ Court subject to subsection (1) of this Section.

No such material was placed before this court. There is no evidence that the defendants obtained leave before filing, if any, the said notice of appeal. Even if leave was obtained at the High Court, evidence of it ought to be produced before this court for the purpose of the application for stay of proceedings.

Learned counsel for both parties rightly submitted that there must be a competent appeal for an application for stay of proceedings to be proper. See Okafor v Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (pt. 64) 129 SC cited by the claimant and Wema Bank Plc v Tonade (2008) All FWLR (pt.443) 1280 cited by the defendants/applicants. See alsoOlawunmiv Muhammed (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 516 SC.

In Ayeni v. Eledo (2005) 12 NWLR (pt.939) 368 the Court of Appeal stated thus: ‘there must be a competent appeal pending. The court will not consider an application for stay of proceedings in respect of an invalid appeal.’ See also N.B.N. Ltd. v. N.E.T. Ltd. (1986) 3 NWLR (pt.31) 667;Lekwot v. Judicial Tribunal (1997) 8 NWLR (pt.515) 22.

Very recently on 12 March 2015 the full panel of the Court of Appeal in National Judicial Council v Agumagu (2015) LPELR-24503(CA) held thus: ‘Where leave of court is required for filing an appeal and an appellant ignores seeking and obtaining the requisite leave before filing same, the appeal is rendered incompetent’.

Let it not be taken that I am speaking about the merits or success or failure of the appeal. Rather, I am saying there is no appeal in law against the ruling of 9 September 2014 to be considered for the purpose of this application for stay of proceedings. It follows, therefore, as I noted earlier, that the foundation of this application having been removed, the said application fails. It is hereby dismissed.

SUBSTANTIVE SUIT

Parties are on common ground that:

1. The defendants are former employees of FMBN and later FMFL from where they retired.
2. The defendants occupied their flats and paid rents till their retirement but not afterwards.
3. The defendants were retired at various times namely 1995 and 2003 by FMFL.

Parties differ on the following:

1. Whether FMFL has been liquidated and no longer a legal person.
2. Whether the power of attorney is valid.
3. Whether FMFL has the reversionary interest in the premises.
4. Whether this suit is competent.

ISSUE NO. 1

Whether there is a landlord and tenant relationship between the parties.

In a tenancy matter as in a case of trespass and injunction title is not in issue and the claimant need not be the owner of the premises: Amakor v. Obiefuna (1974) 3 S.C. 49.In this regard section 47 of the Tenancy Law of Lagos State 2011 provides:

“Landlord” in relation to any premises means the person entitled to the immediate reversion of the premises or if the property is held in joint tenancy (sic) or tenancy in common (sic), any of the persons entitled to the immediate reversion and includes –

(a) the attorney, solicitor, agent or caretaker of any such landlord;

(b) any person receiving (whether in his own right or as an attorney or agent.) any rent from any person for the occupation of any premises in respect of which he claims a right to receive the same: or

(c) a former landlord where the context so requires. (Underline supplied).

In his defence, however the defendant can make title an issue and once it is properly made, the case turns on who has a better title. The caveat is that in a tenancy matter before a magistrates’ court an issue of title must be raised in good faith and not merely to secure a dismissal of the case or merely to oust the jurisdiction of the court to determine the case. Thus the claim of title must be clear and unambiguous; it must not be raised vaguely: Oluwo v Adebowale (1959) 1 NSCC 120 @ 122.Indeed, it should not be raised where it resides in a third party otherwise the doctrine of jus tertii will apply against the defendant: section 2(2) Tenancy Law 2011. But once properly raised the Magistrates’ Court loses its jurisdiction over the case: section 28(7) (a) Magistrates’ Court Law (2009); Badiru v Eletu (1967) 5 NSCC 242.

The case of the defendants is that FMBN was their employer and landlord before FMFL became their employer but not their landlord; and then FMFL was liquidated in 2003 before and after some of them retired or were retired. Their written depositions are the same in many respects. In each of the written depositions paragraphs 5,6, 9, 11, 12 and 15 read:

1. ‘Myself and some of the other defendants in this suit were among those whose services in FMBN were transferred to FMFL continuous, as if we were still with FMBN with entitlements to all our pensions and gratuities’
2. ‘As staff of FMBN whose services were transferred to FMFL, wewere allotted block of flats at T close 3rd Avenue Festac Town Lagos State…’
3. ‘Upon liquidation of FMFL, all affected staff of FMFL were directed to the Federal Civil Service so that they can be absolved into the Federal Civil Service.’
4. ‘When we were not taken by the Federal Civil Service, the FMFL now called us and gave us an option of voluntary retirement upon the promise of payment of acertain amount which they said was going to be continuous payment on a monthly basis.’
5. ‘That since then (2003), FMFL has failed, refused and neglected to pay us our continuous pension entitlements and gratuities as promised.’
6. ‘The above mentioned block of flats, the subject matter of this action were allotted to us upon our being employed and promoted to senior staff of FMBN and it is only FMBN that allotted the flats to us that can apply to court for us to vacate same.’

From the evidence, the defendants paid rents through deductions from their salaries. Payment of rents stopped when their employment ceased. It, therefore, cannot be seriously argued that when their services were transferred from FMBN to FMFL their salaries were not transferred. Looking at paragraphs 5 and 12 of their written depositions reproduced above, it is clear that the defendants acknowledged that having taken over their services from FMBN following the deconsolidation of 1993, FMFL became responsible for all their monetary entitlements including salaries (while in service) and gratuities (after retirement). Their rents were thus deducted from their salaries by FMFL. See, for example, exhibit 5, the letter of allocation of the flat dated 27 March 1998 issued by FMFL to Aromeh, the defendant in MCB/203/2010.

Also, chapter 4 of exhibit 8, The Report of The Task Force on The Deconsolidation, shows that assets and liabilities were at least tentatively deconsolidated and shared between FMBN and FMFL to the effect that the premises in question in these consolidated suits were transferred to the claimant. It is not in evidence that FMBN has at any time disputed this position or challenged FMFL over the premises. Indeed, both FMBN and FMFL have cooperated in many respects as sister companies and even the defendants sometimes appreciated that fact. For example, the letter of the defendants dated 16 May 2009 (exhibit 26) entitled Willingness/Acceptance To Purchase Our Flats, was addressed to ‘The Managing Director/Chief Executive, Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria/Federal Mortgage Finance Limited’. Furthermore, exhibit 25 is a copy of the Statement of Claim in a suit (No. M/544/07) filed at the High Court of Lagos State by twelve of the defendants herein against FMBN. In paragraph 14 of exhibit 25 the twelve claimants (but twelve defendants herein) averred thus, ‘Following the deconsolidation, there were assets sharing by which the ownership in the property in question in these proceedings was vested in Federal Mortgage Finance Limited’.

Section 142 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides:

When the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand to each other in those relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.

Underline supplied.

I must say again that ownership is not an issue in this suit but it has indices of reversionary rights. Thus where family property is shared or personal property sold, the law presumes that the tenant in occupation before the partition or sale automatically becomes the tenant of whoever becomes the new owner of the premises occupied by him even though he has not paid rent to the new owner and no tenancy agreement between them exists in fact. The law also presumes that the new owner acquires all the liabilities of the former landlord relating to the property such as advance rent so that upon becoming the new owner he is presumed to have collected the advance rent.

Accordingly, the new owner may take steps immediately to determine the tenancy upon grounds known to law (such as personal use) and the tenant cannot deny his reversionary rights.

It is in the light of the above that the argument of the defendants that exhibit 8 is a draft and tentative arrangement and therefore a worthless paper is unacceptable. This is because a tentative arrangement may change or may be adopted as final arrangement: A.-G.Kwara State v Alao (2000) 9 NWLR (pt. 671) 84 @ 99 CA. Where the conduct of the parties to such tentative arrangement shows that they have followed the tentative arrangementsuch a tentative arrangement is taken to have been affirmed by their conduct.This is also supported by the fact that after the tentative arrangement both FMBN and FMFL have cooperated in many respects as sister companies (and even the defendants sometimes appreciated that fact as said above) and FMBN never challenged FMFL on FMFL’s acts of deduction of rents from the salaries of the defendants over the premises. An example is exhibit 5 (a letter of allocation of flat to one of the defendants issued by FMFL) which stipulates the conditions of the allocation of flat including rent. I’m afraid the burden of proof placed on the defendants by section 142 of the Evidence Act 2011 has not been discharged. It is, therefore, safe for me to hold, and I so hold, that there is a landlord and tenant relationship between the parties and the claimant is the landlord of the defendants. Issue No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.

ISSUE NO. 2: Whether this suit is competent.

The arguments of the defendants on this issue are four: (a) FMFL is not the owner of the premises; (b) FMFL has been liquidated and no longer exists in law; (c) the power of attorney is a forgery and therefore invalid; (d) FMFL is not entitled to possession until it pays all the pension and gratuities of the defendants.

In my discussion of issue No. 1, I stated that the landlord need not be the owner of the premises. The argument that the FMFL has been liquidated and no longer exists in law was based on a letter of Termination of Appointment dated 16 December 2003 which stated that the liquidation of the FMFL had been approved by the Federal Government. With respect, that does not amount to liquidation. At best it was an intention to commence the liquidation process. It is not in evidence that the liquidation process ever commenced or concluded. The closest to liquidation of FMFL is exhibit 51 (a photocopy of a document purportedly obtained from the Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja) which consists of membership of board of directors for winding up of FMFL. It was addressed to the Registrar-General, Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja. However, though it has a stamp of Certified True Copy on it, it was not duly certified by any one. The space for the signature of the officer to do the certification was left void. In other words, no one signed it as a Certified True Copy and this court cannot give it probative value.

The other documents obtained from the internet (such as exhibits 38, 39 and 46) are themselves photocopies without foundation and authentication. As I held in one of my rulings on admissibility, an excuse that the original of a document obtained from the internet is lost when the original is available on and obtainable from the internet is not acceptable. They are, therefore, discountenanced.

The defendants also relied on exhibit 50 (Revenue Demand Notice dated 28 February 2014) issued by Federal Housing Authority (FHA) to FMBN on the premises in question. The defendants argued that FHA would have issued the Demand Notice to FMFL had it not been liquidated. With respect, that does not prove liquidation.

On the allegation of forgery of the power of attorney, the defendants raised a criminal allegation which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Nwobodo v Onah (1984) 15 NSCC 1;(1984) All N.L.R 1.

The allegation of forgery was based on two premises: (a) FMFL liquidated in 2003 could not have donated the power of attorney in 2008; (b) The signatory of the power of attorney, Mr. Asogwa, was on the staff of FMBN in 2008 because he was transferred to FMBN in 2003 and sacked in 2010 by FMBN and could not have signed the power of attorney in 2008 on behalf of FMFL.

The issue of liquidation has been discussed above.

The defendants invited this court to compare the signature of the Acting MD/CEO

of FMFL on the power of attorney with the signature of one Mr.  Asogwa who as Managing Director/Chief Executive of FMFL issued exhibits A and B annexed to the Motion on Notice dated 11 October 2013. The defendants then concluded that because in 2008 (when the power of attorney was donated) the said signatory was described as Acting MD/CEO of FMFL but he was previously described as Managing Director/Chief Executive in 2003 (as shown in exhibits A and B annexed to the Motion on Notice dated 11 October 2013), there was forgery.

I have done the comparison and found that the signatures are the same. But mere description of status of the signatory differently at different times does not establish forgery (which is a crime) beyond reasonable proof.

On whether an opposing party should complain about a power of attorney, a

passage from a Supreme Court decision reads:

‘It is argued in the respondent’s brief that there was nothing in Exhibit B authorising the donee of the power of attorney to sue on behalf of the donor. Bryant, Powis, & Bryant v. La Banque Du Peuple (1893) AC 170, 177 is cited in support of the submission that a power of attorney is to be construed strictly. If Exhibit B did not empower Mr. Adeniji to sue on behalf of the plaintiff, I think it is for the plaintiff to complain and not the company.’ See Melwani v. Five Star Ind. Ltd. (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt.753) 217 SC.

Borrowing a leaf from that passage, it is for FMFL to cry foul and not the defendants and if, as argued by the defendants, FMFL is dead and, therefore, cannot cry, the defendants should have called FMBN to testify on whether Mr. Asogwa was on its staff when he signed the power of attorney on behalf of FMFL. I hold that the defendants failed to impugn the power of attorney.

On whether the claimant must pay all the pension and gratuities of the defendants to be entitled to possession, I’m afraid the position of the defendants is not supported in law and the learned defence counsel did not make any submission on that point. As rightly submitted on behalf of the claimant, the issue of pension and gratuities cannot be determined by this court. At least not in this suit which is purely a tenancy matter without a counter claim. In a tenancy matter without a counter claim the onus on the claimant is discharged when he has succeeded in proving his claim. The task of the claimant is lightened when the defendant has no contrary evidence because once the claimant has produced prima facie evidence the onus shifts and without contrary evidence, the onus remains on the defendant.

This is otherwise known as the standard of proof in civil proceedings. It is measured by preponderance of evidence on the imaginary scale of justice in which ‘the evidence adduced by the plaintiff should be put on one side of the imaginary scale mentioned in Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91; section 134 Evidence Act and the evidence adduced by the defendant is put on the other side of that scale and weighed together to see which side preponderates.’ See Buhari v INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 246 @ 355 SC.

By that is not meant just the quantity of the evidence but its quality, for evidence may be minimal but credible as in an undefended suit; it may be abundant yet not credible as in a criminal matter in which a no case submission is upheld: Atano v A.-G (Bendel)(1988) 2 NWLR (pt. 75) 201 @ 231 SC.

It may be scanty yet needs no further proof as in admission by the opposing party or non-contradicted evidence. In other words, a party has convinced the court that his version of the facts is more probable than the version presented, if any, by his opponent: Mogaji v Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91. Thus where the scale is evenly weighed, the claimant has not discharged his onus: section 132 of the Evidence Act.

Section 133(2) of the Evidence Act provides:

(2) If the party referred to in subsection (1) of this section adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy the court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced, and so on successively, until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.

That is the provision for the production of contrary or further evidence. In the instant consolidated suits, none of the defendants has any contrary evidence that since his retirement he has not paid any rent. Similarly, there is no contrary evidence on the service of the statutory notices and other court processes. There is no contrary evidence on the quantum of the rent or the current market value of the premises given by the claimant vide exhibit 3 (Valuation Report). The defendants’ attack on exhibit 3 (Valuation Report) was simply that its maker was not called for the purpose of cross-examination.

The Supreme Court has held that ‘a landlord is certainly not bound to use the rent payable during the tenancy as a yardstick in his determination of mesne profits’: Ayinke v Lawal(1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 356) 263.

The apex court also held thus:

“Being unliquidated and based on the fair open market annual value of the premises, the rate of mesne profits are at large; their assessment is not necessarily based on the reserved rent and the tenant who holds over is liable to pay to the landlord the fair or actual value adjudged by the court to be due for use and occupation of the premises. See Adebanjo v. Tenesse Nigeria Inc. (1974) 2 S.C.1. The onus, of course, is on the plaintiff to establish to the satisfaction of the court what this fair open market annual value of the premises in issue is.”

For the court to reach any conclusion it needs evidence which can be in different forms depending on the requirements of the law and the circumstances of the case. Unfortunately, the defendants concentrated on the alleged liquidation of FMFL, validity of the power of attorney and ownership of the premises and ignored the heads of claim by the claimant.

In my humble view, the production of exhibit 3 (Valuation Report) made by Jide Taiwo & Co. (Estate Surveyors &Valuers) dated 4 March 2010 is prima facie evidence of the market value of the premises which the court can rely upon in the absence of contrary evidence. The report of the valuer is that the annual rental value of each of the two-bedroom flats is N350,000.00 while the annual rental value of each of the three-bedroom flats is N400,000.00. But the mesne profit being claimed on the two-bedroom flat is N300,000.00 per annum. Also, though the defendants have not paid rents since their retirements which occurred before 2007, the claimant claims arrears of rent from January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits from January 2010.This court cannot award more than what is claimed.

From the foregoing and for all the reasons given above, I hold that the claimant succeeds and judgment is hereby entered as follows:

In respect of MCB/210/2010 – Ajoku v Sholanke:

1. IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the three-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendantN1,050,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N400,000.00k per annum (N33,333.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs. S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/202/2010 – Ajoku v Alabi:

1. IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/203/2010 – Ajoku v Aromeh:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/204/2010 – Ajoku v Olajubutu:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/205/2010 – Ajoku v Ikhalo:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/206/2010 – Ajoku v Ikemefuna:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/208/2010 – Ajoku v Ogunleye:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/211/2010 – Ajoku v Mgbolu:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/212/2010 – Ajoku v Olayemi:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/213/2010 – Ajoku v Udekwe:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/214/2010 – Ajoku v Lawal:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/215/2010 – Ajoku v Akamadu:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/216/2010 – Ajoku v Yanfa:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the two-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN750,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N300,000.00k per annum (N25,000.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/207/2010 – Ajoku v Onova:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the three-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN1,050,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N400,000.00k per annum (N33,333.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/209/2010 – Ajoku v Ogodo:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the three-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN1,050,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N400,000.00k per annum (N33,333.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.

In respect of MCB/217/2010 – Ajoku v Akinwunmi:

1. ITIS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the claimant do recover against the defendant the possession of the three-bedroom flat at Block 1 , T close 3rd Avenue, Festac Town, Lagos State.
2. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED thatthe claimant do recover against the defendantN1,050,000.00k as arrears of rent for the period of January 2007 to December 2009 and mesne profits at the rate of N400,000.00k per annum (N33,333.00k per month) from 1 January 2010 till possession is given up.

M.A.ETTI

MAGISTRATE

Chief K.C. Ajoku for the claimant.

Mrs S. Ekhator for the defendants.

Judgment delivered.